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Abstract 
 
David Friedman posed a number of libertarian philosophical problems (Friedman 1989). This 
essay criticizes Walter Block’s Rothbardian responses (Block 2011) and compares them with 
J C Lester’s critical-rationalist, libertarian-theory responses (Lester [2000] 2012). The main 
issues are as follows. 1. Critical rationalism and how it applies to libertarianism. 2.1. How 
libertarianism is not inherently about law and is inherently about morals. 2.2. How liberty 
relates to property and can be maximized: carbon dioxide and radio waves. 2.3. Applying the 
theory to flashlights. 2.4. Applying the theory to the probability of imposed risks. 2.5. 
“Homesteading” or initial acquisition. 2.6 What is “essential” for a “true libertarian.” 2.7. 
Crime and punishment. 2.8. Extent of punishment. 2.9. The libertarian response to a madman 
with a gun. 2.10. How contradictions in rights are possible. 2.11. The draft. 3.1. Utilitarian 
libertarianism and “nose counting”. 3.2. How interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
possible and utility monsters are not a threat. 3.3. Why it is not utilitarian in practice to kill an 
innocent prisoner to prevent a riot. 3.4. Why David Friedman should not be forced to give up 
one of his eyes. 3.5. How utilitarians can be libertarians. Conclusion: a proper theory of 
liberty combined with critical rationalism offers superior solutions to Friedman’s problems. 
Appendix: replies to two commentators. 
 
Overview 
 
In Escape from Leviathan (2000) I discussed some problems that David Friedman posed for 
libertarian philosophy in his The Machinery of Freedom (1989).
1
 In his ―David Friedman and 
Libertarianism: A Critique‖ (2011)2, Walter Block has also responded to the same arguments in 
Friedman‘s book. Professor Block is a leading Rothbardian libertarian who has answers to Friedman 
that are significantly different from my own. The purpose of this essay is to offer a critical 
commentary on Block‘s responses to Friedman – following his subheadings, for ease of reference – 
and to compare it with my own very different theoretical approach (but with occasional elaborations).  
 
“1. Introduction” 
 
Block begins, ―There is not one philosophy of libertarianism, but rather there are two.‖ And he cites 
the ―utilitarian‖ and the ―deontological‖ types (1). I am very happy to bring Professor Block the good 
news that there is at least one other philosophy of libertarianism. For in addition to any 
                                                   
1
 David Friedman was kind enough to say that some of my replies were ―ingenious‖ but he declined either to 
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 Block 2011. 
consequentialist philosophies (and I would not restrict these to utilitarianism, in any of its flavours) 
and any deontological philosophies (and I would not restrict these to the Rothbardian-Blockian one) 
there is also critical-rationalist libertarianism, which does not base libertarianism on anything at all. 
For this view applies Karl Popper‘s extreme fallibilist epistemology of critical rationalism. As this 
remains not well known, I shall begin by very briefly outlining both critical rationalism and how I 
take it to apply to libertarianism. 
According to critical rationalism, no theory (or thesis, view, outlook, opinion, argument, proof, 
etc.) can ever rule out the possibility of a refuting counter-instance or counter-argument (including 
critical rationalism itself, of course). With our finite and fallible reasoning facing the infinite worlds 
of unknown matter and theories, we never know what we might have overlooked. Therefore, theories 
cannot be justified (or supported, grounded, founded, based, backed, established, proven, etc.). All 
theories remain conjectures (or guesses, assumptions, suppositions, and so forth). We are obliged to 
use some conjectures for practical purposes; and not always unrefuted conjectures.
3
 But the only 
epistemologically useful thing we can do with conjectures is to criticize or test them as best we can. If 
we cannot refute them, then they remain conjectures – but they might well be true, of course.4 If we 
can refute them, then we learn something new. Truth is what we are aiming at, but we can only hope 
to make progress by rejecting theories that appear to be false. 
However, refutations are themselves conjectural. So no refutation is ever justified either. 
Fortunately, there is a crucial asymmetry between a justification and a refutation. A conjectural 
refutation is coherent. It makes sense to say, if this observed phenomenon is a black swan, then ―all 
swans are white‖ is refuted. Or if this is a correctly derived inconsistency, then the theory from which 
it is derived is false. By contrast, a conjectural justification is incoherent. We could not observe all 
swans (everywhere and everywhen) being white. Nor could we prove the assumptions of an allegedly 
justifying argument without entering an infinite regress. It needs to be understood that much that is 
mistaken for ‗justification‘ is actually an explanation,5 or application, or defence, or test. These may 
often be true or useful, but they are themselves conjectures and usually incomplete. 
How does this apply to libertarianism? It is a conjecture that it is desirable in normal practice to 
allow universal interpersonal liberty. Libertarians think that this conjecture is not refuted by any 
criticism. All we can do is try to defend it by answering the best criticisms that we can find – and 
those of critics of libertarianism (occasionally these overlap). What about rights? One might 
conjecture that rights to liberty are the best rights, and then consider criticisms. What about utility? 
One might conjecture that liberty is the main cause of promoting utility (in terms of the satisfaction of 
spontaneous preferences, in particular), and then consider criticisms.
6
 I say ―might‖ because neither of 
these views can support the universal theory of libertarianism and because a defender of 
libertarianism might offer different answers concerning rights, or utility, or whatever some specific 
criticism is about. The point is to attempt the possible (to refute the particular potential refutation 
somehow, e.g., ―Genetic tests indicate that this alleged black swan is really a new species of goose‖) 
and to avoid the impossible (to establish the universal conjecture, e.g., ―Genetic tests show that every 
swan – everywhere and everywhen – is white‖). 
In addition to that outline, I ought to mention the type of liberty that I assume libertarians to be 
defending. It is a kind of interpersonal liberty. In particular, it is about people being unconstrained by 
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 Newtonian mechanics are refuted but often useful approximations for practical purposes. The conjecture that 
people can fly by the power of thought alone, by contrast, appears to be refuted and not worth trying in any 
dangerous context. 
4
 And either a theory or its negation must be true (assuming the logical law, or principle, of excluded middle). 
5
 E.g., ‗Markets allocate resources efficiently by people bidding for them in proportion to their profitability, 
whether monetary or psychic‘. 
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 This is called the ―classical liberal compatibility thesis‖ in Lester [2000] 2012. See Chapter 5, p.76, fn 13. 
other people‘s interferences, or invasions, or aggressions, or trespasses, or – as I prefer to theorize it – 
it is about the absence of proactively imposed costs, ultimately in a pre-propertarian sense (more on 
this later). 
Therefore, when Block asserts that his deontological libertarianism ―is based on the non 
aggression principle (NAP)‖ (1), there are at least three possible problems. 1) This statement is fine as 
long as he means ―based‖ only in an explanatory sense, but not if he means it in any kind of 
grounding or justifying sense. 2) He cannot be literally right to explain this as ―no one may properly 
initiate violence against another person or his justly owned property.‖ For a thief need not use 
violence (e.g., when shoplifting: a shoplifter is not thereby a ‗violent criminal‘, is he?). And 
libertarian police may legitimately initiate violence against a non-violent thief, if necessary. 3) Any 
actual theory of liberty is at best tacit. 
 
“2. Critique” 
“2.1. Initiation of coercion” 
 
Block is scathing about the fact that ―Friedman starts off by attributing to ‗many libertarians‘ the view 
that ‗it is always wrong to initiate coercion.‘‖ Given Block‘s subtitle and first sentence, I initially 
assumed ―coercion‖ to be his target. I also made that assumption because what Block ought to be 
objecting to first and foremost here is, indeed, the expression ―initiate coercion‖. For just as with 
―initiating violence‖ this cannot be literally correct. A thief does not need to initiate coercion (force or 
the threat of force); and libertarian police often do need to initiate it. Instead, Block objects to the 
words ―many libertarians‖ and ―always wrong‖. In particular, he tells us that ―Libertarianism is a 
theory or a branch of law, not morality‖ (3). To make his point, Block supposes a ―libertarian‖ who 
takes a job as a ―Nazi concentration camp guard‖ in order to save many people (who would otherwise 
have been killed) even though he has to kill even more than he saves – ―So as to demonstrate his 
bon[a] fides, and not be killed by the other guar[d]s for dereliction of duty‖ (footnote 7). Block says, 
―Not only were his actions moral, they were heroic.‖ But when he is ―brought before the Nuremberg 
Court. Will he be found guilty of murder? Of course he will.‖ Though if the heirs of his victims 
forgive this ―hero‖ he will escape punishment. Block asserts, ―If these considerations do not establish 
a distinction, no, a chasm, between law and morality, then nothing will‖ (4). 
It is interesting that Block appears to be a sort of utilitarian or consequentialist in some rather 
extreme matters of morals. But putting that curiosity aside, there are two main problems with his 
example. 1) It is, at best, not obvious that the ―libertarian‖ guard has behaved morally by murdering 
some people in order to be able to save others. Many people would surely disagree – I am not 
convinced myself – and so the force of the point is weak. 2) The other Nazi guards were behaving in 
accordance with German state-law at the time. And, without going into details, the Nuremberg Court 
is problematic as an example of libertarian law in action. These add further points of confusion, at 
least. 
Therefore, let us consider a simpler example. Someone takes a car without permission so that he 
can ram open the jammed doors of a burning office block and rescue the trapped occupants. The car is 
destroyed but the people are freed. Was his behaviour moral? I suspect that most self-identified 
libertarians would agree that it was. Did it flout libertarian law? Yes, because he stole and destroyed 
the car and now owes compensation to the car‘s owner. So what does this show? It does not show that 
libertarianism is not about morals. It merely shows that morality and libertarianism can sometimes 
diverge in extremis. But that does not alter the fact that it is usually moral to respect libertarian law. 
Moreover, libertarianism is not a theory of what the law currently is anywhere. It is, at most, a theory 
of what the law ought to be. And thus libertarianism is partly a moral theory. More precisely, 
however, libertarianism is an ideology. Therefore, it contains both factual and moral theses. Broadly 
understood, these theses are that liberty generally promotes human welfare and is moral. In fact, law 
does not need to be mentioned at all. And if a society were to comprise only libertarian people, then – 
in principle – there might not need to be any law (at least, if property rights are obvious enough). 
People would generally behave in a libertarian way – except for the occasional emergency where they 
would offer compensation afterwards. So much for the thesis that libertarianism is not about morals at 
all, but only about law. On the contrary, it is not inherently about law at all and it is inherently about 
morals (qua ideology
7
). 
“2.2. Absolute control” 
 
Next Block considers Friedman‘s assumption of ―absolute‖ property rights, whereby Block quotes 
Friedman saying about carbon dioxide that, ―If I have no right to impose a single molecule of 
pollution on anyone else‘s property, then I must get the permission of all my neighbors to breath[e]‖ 
(4). Block‘s response: ―Libertarianism is a theory of law. And a basic element of law, in pretty much 
any of its emanations, is de minimis: The law does not concern itself with trifles.‖ As we have seen, 
libertarianism is not a theory of law, as such, and there might not even need to be laws in a libertarian 
society. However, one can advocate libertarian law – law based on libertarian principles – and I do so 
myself. And Block does quite well to cite the de minimis principle as a response to Friedman. It is not 
a hopeless response. Ultimately, though, it does not deal with the underlying philosophical problem – 
as we shall soon see. 
Block then quotes Rothbard on this where Rothbard concludes, ―Conviction of guilt ‗beyond a 
reasonable doubt‘ appears to be the standard most consonant with libertarian principle‖ (4). I can only 
guess that Block means to imply that trifles cannot amount to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But 
that does not seem to add much. Block is more substantial when he cites Rothbard on ―radio waves‖ 
where Rothbard argues 
 
we must refine our concept of invasion to mean not just boundary crossing, but boundary 
crossings that in some way interfere with the owner‘s use or enjoyment of this property. What 
counts is whether the senses of the property owner are interfered with. (5) 
 
There are two main problems with this. First, radio waves are objectively invasive of other people‘s 
property: they physically pass through human bodies and many other things. Therefore, this does not 
―refine our concept of invasion.‖ Instead, what it implies is that some invasions are to be allowed. 
Second, what counts cannot be ―whether the senses of the property owner are interfered with‖ because 
a) trespassing would be acceptable as long as no ―senses of the property owner are interfered with‖ 
(and most libertarians would not think that even undetected trespassing is acceptable); b) damage 
would be acceptable as long as no ―senses of the property owner are interfered with‖ (and most 
libertarians would not think that even undetected damage is acceptable); and c) some ‗sense 
interferences‘ need to be tolerated if liberty is to be maximized (more on this below).  
So what is the correct libertarian response? It is to have a more refined theory of liberty. In fact, to 
have an explicit theory of liberty at all would be a start – many libertarians do not. I tend to say that 
people have interpersonal liberty to the extent that others do not proactively impose on them. But this 
is ultimately a pre-propertarian theory of liberty. And so in the event of new problems or clashes of 
liberty we can appeal to it to work out the best way to minimize any proactive impositions. It follows 
from this theory that people owning themselves is virtually always liberty-maximizing (because 
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proactive-imposition-minimizing). Similarly, ownership by use of unowned resources and after that 
by voluntary title-transfer is also almost always liberty-maximizing. I don‘t want to go into more 
detail than is needed here, so I will leave it at that for now.
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How does this apply to the two problems concerning carbon dioxide and radio waves? If I prefer 
not to have either your carbon dioxide or your radio waves objectively invading my property, 
including my body, then they do proactively impose on me to some small degree when they do so. 
But for me, or my agents, to prevent you from producing carbon dioxide or radio waves would 
proactively impose to a vastly greater extent on you (especially the prevention of your carbon-dioxide 
emissions). And the liberty-maximizing policy must be to prefer the lesser imposition. Moreover, the 
imposition on me is so trivial with radio waves that any compensation is too small to be economic to 
collect. While in the case of carbon dioxide, any compensation is cancelled out by my own, similar, 
carbon-dioxide production imposing on you. These, then, are the same practical outcomes as Block 
has here. However, now we have relatively clear theoretical explanations of how they are libertarian. 
Furthermore, the practical outcomes will not always be the same as Block‘s proffered solutions – as 
we shall see. 
“2.3. Super flashlights” 
 
Block then quotes Friedman‘s argument that ―absolute‖ property rights against invasion could prevent 
us from having any lights where the photons would trespass on the property of others, because there is 
no difference in principle between ―a thousand megawatt laser beam‖ and ―the brightness of a 
flashlight‖ (6). Block objects that ―Just because the colors of the rainbow, ROYGBIV blend into one 
another, does not mean we cannot distinguish extreme points at the end of this distribution, nor, even, 
all throughout it‖ (6). 
But Block‘s response is based on a misunderstanding. Friedman‘s point is not about the 
impossibility of distinguishing something that does damage from something that doesn‘t, because 
there is a continuum between them (which would be a version of the sorites paradox
9
). Rather, it is 
that absolute property rights could prevent things at the non-damaging end exactly as much as at the 
damaging end. And Friedman is absolutely right on that point. The correct answer to Friedman is that 
libertarian property rights are not absolute. They have to be modified where there is a clash with 
interpersonal liberty. And so, for instance, it proactively imposes on me significantly if I am not 
allowed to have ordinary lights on my property (or must have perfect blackouts). But it proactively 
imposes on you to a tiny degree that my photons objectively invade your property. So the lesser 
imposition must be preferred. And there will be no compensation due, either because the damages 
would be too small to collect or because of equivalent opposite ―invasions‖ cancelling any claim. 
“2.4. Probability of risk” 
 
Block next looks at Friedman applying similar arguments to risk. He cites Friedman‘s comparison 
between playing Russian roulette with someone else‘s head and flying a plane with a very small 
possibility that it might crash and kill people. Friedman thinks that imposing the risk of death, 
however small, on other people is incompatible with the ―right not to be coerced, stated as an absolute 
moral principle‖ (7). 
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 Briefly, if you remove a grain of sand from a heap of sand, at what point does it cease to be a ‗heap‘ (from 
which word in Greek ‗sorites‘ is derived)? It seems that there cannot be such a point. But if removing one grain 
always leaves a heap, then one grain alone is still a heap (moreover, removing that grain leaves a heap too). So 
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Let us ignore both ‗coercion‘ (as potentially confusing) and morals (as irrelevant to the real 
philosophical problem). We can then ask, is the imposition of a risk incompatible with libertarianism 
as absolute non-invasiveness? And the answer is, again, yes it is. But, rightly conceived, 
libertarianism is not about absolute non-invasiveness; it is about minimizing invasions. Where there is 
a clash, the lesser imposition is to be preferred and any significant compensation will be due. In the 
case of compulsory Russian roulette the proactive imposition is, to all practical intents and purposes, 
all one way: against the victim of the game. So this can be ruled out by libertarianism without 
weighing impositions against each other.
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 In the case of flying a plane, a weighing is more plausible. 
It does proactively impose on some people that they are at an extremely small risk of being hit by a 
falling plane. But that risk is probably too small to be worth suing for. It would proactively impose to 
a far greater degree if people were not allowed to fly by plane. Therefore, tolerating flying is liberty-
maximizing (or proactive-imposition minimizing). 
Block thinks that the problem is the word ―absolute‖ (7). But that looks like a mistake. For 
―absolute‖ is only really used by Friedman for emphasis. In ‗non-aggression‘, the prefix ‗non‘ is itself 
an absolute. The real problem is that property-right aggressions (or invasions, or incursions, or 
trespasses, or impositions) must sometimes be allowed because clashes are inevitable. So the simple 
principle of non-aggression (or non-whatever) cannot be sufficient. Rather, it ought to be interpreted, 
in practice, to include minimizing aggression in the event of clashes. Put simply, ‗non-aggression‘ is 
what liberty is, and ‗minimizing aggression‘ is the practical libertarian policy. Block has no adequate 
theoretical solution here. 
Rothbard is said to be right where he says, ―Only if the radio transmissions are proven to be 
harmful to Smith‘s person beyond a reasonable doubt should Jones‘s activities be subject to 
injunction.‖ But that cannot be right, for there could be detectable but insignificant harm that is 
outweighed by the huge benefit of radio transmissions. 
I conclude, therefore, that Friedman has put his finger on an important theoretical problem. The 
simple non-aggression principle is not ―intact and unscathed‖, as Block asserts (9). It has to be 
modified to deal with clashes. But once it is modified to include the minimization of aggressions (or 
invasions, etc.) then the problem is solved and the answer is clear in principle. We do not need to rely 
on Block‘s relatively weak appeal to how it would be ―reasonably interpreted‖ in practical situations.  
“2.5. Homesteading” 
 
Block next takes Friedman to task over ―homesteading‖. He particularly objects to Friedman‘s using 
John Locke as his target, for ―Locke is a relatively poor representative of libertarian homesteading 
theory‖ (10). But then Block immediately asks ―where oh where did Friedman get the pernicious idea 
that ‗land starts out belonging equally to everyone‘?‖ However mistaken the idea is, and I agree that it 
is, it is famously repeated many times (the expression ―in common‖ 29 times) in Locke‘s Second 
Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 5, ―Of Property‖, where the chapter begins, ―God, as King 
David says (Psalms cxv.16), has given the earth to the children of men – given it to mankind in 
common.‖ 
Block rejects, as a fabrication, Friedman‘s account of ―claiming … or marking … boundaries‖ or 
―loudly announcing that it is yours‖ as a way of establishing ownership (10). Instead, Block insists on 
―homesteading‖ (which potentially confusing expression I take to mean ‗initial acquisition‘) and the 
                                                   
10
 Strictly speaking, in all normal cases, allowing the use of other people‘s bodies without their permission 
would be an immense proactive imposition on them. But not being allowed to do this would be a relatively 
trivial imposition. Hence self-ownership is derived from applying liberty as minimizing proactive impositions. 
But we no more need to try to weigh the difference than we need to weigh an elephant against an ant to 
determine which is heavier. 
necessity that one has ―mixed his labor‖. So, having insisted that ―Locke is a relatively poor 
representative of libertarian homesteading theory‖ (10) the only clue to ―homesteading‖ we are given 
is Locke‘s own labour-mixing theory: ―when he takes something from the state that nature has 
provided and left it in, he mixes his labour with it, thus joining to it something that is his own; and in 
that way he makes it his property.‖ (Locke, ibid.)  
Three questions to Block occur to me. 1) How does ―homesteading‖ relate to a clear theory of 
liberty (for Block is supposed to be explaining libertarianism, which ought to have principles 
explicable in terms of liberty itself and not ad hoc additions)? 2) Why a ―labor‖ theory of initial 
acquisition (it sounds as anachronistic and dubious as the labour theory of value)? 3) What if someone 
―homesteads‖ the sole natural water supply: in a drought, do others then have to pay whatever he 
chooses to charge or go without water? And I shall help Block by attempting to answer these 
questions. 
1) The reason that initial acquisition (or ―homesteading‖) is libertarian is that it strongly tends to 
maximize liberty, i.e., minimize interpersonal proactive impositions (or, if one prefers, minimize 
interpersonal interferences, aggressions, invasions, initiated constraints, etc.). Without it we face the 
‗tragedy of the commons‘ whereby economizing is drastically curtailed because people cannot help 
being a nuisance to each other. 
2) Labour-mixing is not a bad rule of thumb for initial acquisition. It usually works because when 
others, without our permission, take material things that we have made useful by our labours, then 
they thereby significantly interfere with our projects (and thus proactively impose on us). However, 
theoretically speaking, labour is completely irrelevant. If we simply start to use something that was 
previously unowned, then the imposed interventions of other people will be a constraint on our 
projects. No labour-mixing is necessary. It can be sufficient that we are using the resources in 
question. Of course, without somehow establishing boundary claims we are in a weaker position. For 
then it is often not clear what we are claiming or that there really is a pre-existing claim (rather than 
someone making a claim at that moment or even retrospectively). Consider Block‘s assertion, ―if I 
place a fence around a square mile of land, I own the periphery, but not the inside of it.‖ On the 
contrary, a fence might well suffice for the inside too. For I might have a use for keeping the land 
exactly as it is for a variety of reasons (as an investment, a beauty spot, a sacred grove, etc.). It would 
proactively impose on me to require me to mix my labour with it when that would be both irksome 
and reduce the value or even destroy it (maybe if a sacred grove or beauty spot). But, we may 
suppose, I do not significantly (anywhere near as much) interfere with, or proactively impose on, or 
initiate a constraint on, you in your projects by taking this place for myself. Strictly speaking, what is 
necessary is not labour-mixing but simply using (in whatever way) such that interventions would 
impose on us more than our ownership imposes on others. But in extremis things might be different, 
which brings us to 3. 
3) It is generally true that allowing initial acquisition will minimize the extent to which people are 
a nuisance, interference, cost, etc., to each other. For if natural resources cannot be owned, then 
economizing – for one thing – is usually grossly interfered with. And I am not usually a greater 
obstacle to you by obliging you to find some other natural resources than the ones I am already using. 
On balance, initial acquisition (or propertising, as I sometimes call it) minimizes interpersonal 
imposed constraints. But what if someone were to ―homestead‖ the sole natural water supply? This 
might not normally be a problem if there were other sources of water (collected from rain, or by 
desalinization of seawater, or imported, etc.). But what if there were a great drought and no other 
supplies were available? Then it is in principle possible that the, now monopoly, water-owner could 
impose more on other people by charging them high prices (or denying them water) than they could 
impose on him by requiring him to share the water. For he is, ex hypothesi, not the producer or the 
creator or – we may suppose – even the preserver, of the water itself (no matter how much labour-
mingling was involved). He is merely in the way of others who need that natural water supply. 
Therefore, the libertarian principle of minimizing interpersonal proactive impositions (or constraints, 
etc.) overrides his ownership. Such extreme situations are undoubtedly rare, but they illustrate two 
things. First, ―homesteading‖ is not inherently libertarian. Second, the libertarian principle is 
ultimately pre-propertarian. It should also be clear that extremely broad and uncontroversial 
interpersonal comparisons of proactively imposed costs are ultimately inevitable with libertarianism – 
not only in extremis, but also in ordinary cases. Otherwise, we cannot decide how to minimize 
proactive impositions when they clash. (I shall be returning to this issue later where Block deals with 
it in detail.) 
“2.6. Resource value” 
 
Block quotes Friedman‘s view that ―the basis of property in unproduced resources such as land is 
shaky … [but] … it does not matter very much, since only a small fraction of the income of a modern 
society is derived from such resources.‖ Block insists that the fraction is irrelevant because ―for the 
true libertarian, private property rights are absolutely essential.‖ (11) In light of what I have explained 
so far, I should like to amend this criticism thus: ‗for the true libertarian, the principle of liberty is 
absolutely essential, and the correct private property rights are derived from applying that principle to 
the circumstances.‘ 
“2.7. Crime and punishment” 
 
Block quotes Friedman‘s question: ―how in principle do libertarian moral principles tell you what 
degree of proof should be necessary for conviction and punishment?‖ (11). Block replies, 
 
The answer to his challenge is simple: Those responsible for punishing criminals are 
themselves responsible if they violate the rights of an innocent man … the people responsible 
for this miscarriage of justice are themselves to be considered criminals. (12) 
 
And then he quotes Rothbard at length to the same effect. That answer might be ―simple‖ but it is not 
a direct answer to the question as to ―what degree of proof should be necessary‖. It answers the 
question obliquely, at best, if it means ‗convict and punish on whatever degree of proof you like, but 
you will stand to be convicted and punished as criminals if you are mistaken.‘ However, that cannot 
be the right answer, for at least two reasons. First, some low degrees of proof would themselves flout 
the liberty of the accused person. Second, to duly convict and punish an innocent man who one 
honestly believes is almost certainly guilty would be possibly tortious but not criminal. 
A more libertarian answer to Friedman and Block (and Rothbard) might go along the following 
lines. In the easy case, everyone involved, including the alleged criminal, will have contracted to 
accept the procedures of justice (whether beforehand or since the arrest) and any compensations that 
might be due in the event of errors. In this case, there will be a strong tendency for the market to 
produce an efficient outcome, all things considered. And that will include ―what degree of proof 
should be necessary for conviction and punishment‖ (which might vary depending on the type of 
case
11
). In the difficult case, the alleged criminal pleads innocent and has not contracted to accept any 
procedure. What should the court do? Use its best libertarian procedures in good faith. Assume that it 
subsequently turns out that there has been a wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Then the innocent 
man is entitled to sue for full damages from the relevant organizations (which might or might not 
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exceed what he would have been entitled to had he contracted in). However, it would be absurd to say 
that any policeman, judge, or jailer acting in good faith and using the best libertarian practices were 
thereby themselves criminals because of their mistakes. 
“2.8. Extent of punishment” 
 
Block complains that 
 
Friedman‘s is not at all an accurate portrayal of libertarian (proportionality) punishment 
theory. When fully expounded, it consists not only of two teeth for a tooth, but it also 
incorporates the costs of capture as well as compensation for scaring. (13) 
 
Block then elaborates a little and quotes Rothbard on the subject. 
My main objection, as usual, is that Block‘s reply provides no clear theoretical connection to 
liberty, and is somewhat arbitrary as a consequence. A more libertarian response would go along the 
following lines. Liberty is the absence of interpersonal proactively imposed costs (or some similar sort 
of formulation). Assume that someone proactively imposes on you. Then you are due, in order to 
rectify the imposition (as far as is possible, at least), full compensation (or restitution). This should 
aim to make you no worse off than you would have been (ignoring various counterfactual 
complications for the time being
12
). There are three main types of proactive imposition. 1) Where the 
imposition is accidental. 2) Where it is intentional (or reasonably foreseeable). 3) Where it is 
intentional (or reasonably foreseeable) and there is an attempt to escape rectification. I shall now 
explain these. 
1) In the simplest case, for instance, the imposer breaks your window by an accident that amounts 
to a – non-criminal – tort. He, or his insurance company, pays you for rectifying the proximate 
damage done (the broken window) plus more for any inconvenience and associated reasonable 
expenses. 
2) At the next stage, the imposer intentionally, or reasonably foreseeably, breaks your window. 
This amounts to a criminal act in libertarian terms. Accidental impositions are not crimes, unless due 
to gross negligence. But intentional, or reasonably foreseeable, impositions are crimes. If there was no 
attempt to escape rectification, then the full compensation will amount to the same as before plus an 
extra reasonable amount for any fear (as Block rightly mentions), or indignity (which Block 
overlooks), or any other additional imposition that you were caused. Presumably, the imposer could 
not be insured against committing a crime as it is a choice and not an accident. However, there is now 
an additional factor. Because the imposer treated your window as though it were his to break, you 
have the option of doing up to some price-equivalent damage to his property instead of taking the 
compensation. For that would not be a proactive imposition but a reactive one. Yet, unless you feel 
particularly vindictive, there would not seem to be much point. For what you could not do, in 
libertarian terms, is take full compensation and then enact retribution as well. 
3) Suppose we add to 2 the attempt to escape detection. Now we need what I call the ‗risk 
multiplier‘. Let us assume that one in ten people get caught for window-breaking. In addition to the 
proximate imposed cost of the crime, there is also now some cost of detection;
13
 both of these being 
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 For instance, suppose someone intentionally damages your property but accidentally helps you at the same 
time. Perhaps they break your window but thereby let out a dangerous build-up of gas. This benefit is probably 
best seen as your good luck. They still owe you for the broken window: the invasive act. 
13
 The likelihood of capture and the magnitude of the crime will tend to limit how much expense is risked on 
detection. However, if too much is spent (perhaps by some obsessively vengeful billionaire), then it would itself 
go beyond libertarian rectification if it were all passed on to the criminal. The libertarian theoretical limit to 
multiplied in proportion to the imposed risk that the criminal will probably escape. Consequently, if 
we do catch and convict a criminal, we are entitled as full compensation – in the case in question – to 
the proximate criminal compensation plus reasonable detection costs multiplied by ten. For that is the 
only amount that will compensate in full for the imposed cost of the risk, while not going beyond full 
compensation. However, where the damage from crime is insured against, the insurance company will 
quite possibly pay immediately for any proximate damage but then own the full risk-multiplier debt in 
case the criminal is caught (which the insurance company will likely encourage by various means). 
Thus crime would not be a good bet once we factor in the additional compensation costs of fear, 
indignity, detection, and any risk multiplier. However, the criminal is not being proactively imposed 
on. He is simply being made liable for the full damage that he caused. Moreover, the option to take 
some of the restitution in retributive form now becomes more practical. But how far the victim or the 
insurance company takes this would likely be a matter of contracts and business efficiency. 
All this is only an outline of the libertarian view understood in terms of minimizing proactive 
impositions. I deal with various caveats, complications, and criticisms elsewhere.
14
 
“2.9. The madman” 
 
Block cites Friedman‘s example of the madman who 
 
is about to open fire on a crowd; if he does so numerous innocent people will die. The only 
way to prevent him is to shoot him with a rifle that is within reach of several members of the 
crowd. The rifle is on the private property of its legitimate owner. He is a well known 
misanthrope who has publicly stated on numerous occasions that he is opposed to letting 
anyone use his rifle without his permission, even if it would save hundreds of lives. (14) 
 
And Friedman suggests that ―libertarian rights theory‖ does not permit people to take the rifle. But 
Block replies that 
 
based on a correct understanding of this perspective, some hero would grab the gun and stop 
the madman in his tracks, by plugging him with this stolen firearm. Would he then owe a debt 
to the misanthropic shotgun owner? Yes, yes, of course. But it is very likely that any private 
court would go easy on this hero. (15)  
 
I am inclined to go along with Block‘s view as a practical solution, but in what way is it ―based on a 
correct understanding of this perspective‖ (i.e., libertarian theory)? The part about owing ―a debt to 
the misanthropic shotgun owner‖ seems to fit libertarian theory without a problem. But what about the 
rest? The idea that a ―hero‖ simply flouts libertarian property rights for the greater good does not 
solve Friedman‘s theoretical problem. Can we do better? One interesting possibility is libertarian 
consequentialism: maximizing the amount of liberty by whatever means necessary, including 
unlibertarian means. For the owner-flouting, shotgun-borrower would thereby be infringing liberty, 
but only in order to increase the amount of liberty by stopping the murder of innocent people. If 
liberty matters, then why not prefer such libertarian consequentialism? Libertarianism is never 
intended in this way in the literature, as far as I am aware. Problems with it are the same as with 
consequentialism generally. For instance, in less obvious cases how do we compare different people‘s 
                                                                                                                                                              
detection costs probably has to relate to what is normally regarded as economic. I cannot be more theoretically 
precise at the moment. 
14
 See Lester [2000] 2012 Chapter 3, Lester 2011 Chapter 29, and the entries on ―restitution‖ and ―retribution‖ 
in Lester Forthcoming. 
liberties? And how do we stop the undermining of liberty (the ‗moral hazard‘) involved in allowing 
such comparisons (both by corrupt power and people not behaving prudently)? Libertarianism can 
itself be viewed as the right rules for rule (preference-)utilitarianism. So it would be odd not to have 
the same view with respect to liberty, i.e., rule-libertarian-consequentialism requires libertarian 
deontologism.  
But what about very clear cases of exceptions such as the one in hand? I am inclined to give a 
similar answer to the one I gave to the similar problem that Vallentyne posed in his encyclopaedia 
entry on libertarianism (see Chapter 4). If someone flouts a libertarian rule but later pays full 
compensation to the victim of the flouting, then the infraction of libertarian deontologism has been 
fully rectified and so it has not been abandoned in favour of libertarian consequentialism. I can, of 
course, imagine all sorts of cases where we might want to abandon libertarian deontologism. But these 
thought-experiments do not impugn the practical advocacy of libertarian deontologism. If this is not 
exactly the right theoretical answer to Friedman, then it is at least superior to Block‘s appeal to a 
liberty-flouting ―hero‖. 
However, Block himself does give us a little more theory. For he continues that, 
 
according to Friedman, there is a conflict in rights, between the right of members of the crowd 
not to be killed, and the right of the misanthrope to the sole use and possession of his rifle. But 
for the libertarian, there is no such thing ... Whenever there is such a seeming conflict, one or 
both of the so-called rights is mis-specified. Here, the misanthrope has a clear right to his gun, 
but the crowd does not at all have a ―legitimate right … (not to be killed).‖ Rather, this latter 
so-called ―right‖ is not a right at all. Instead, it is an aspect of wealth, or economic welfare. Of 
course, it is a most heinous rights violation for the ―madman‖ to murder innocent members of 
the crowd, but that is another matter. (15) 
 
This passage is somewhat confused. A few brief points in response. 1) The ―crowd‖, i.e., each 
individual member, does have a ―legitimate right … (not to be killed)‖ proactively, i.e., murdered. 
What they do not have a libertarian right to is that some third party stops them from being murdered. 
2) But if a third party does decide to save them in the way described, then there is a clash between 
their right not to be murdered and the gun-owner‘s rights to the control of his gun. It is just that, in 
this example, the clash is not direct but only exists because of the actions of the third party. 3) It is 
probably slightly ideologically blinkered to restrict all legitimate rights to libertarian rights. For 
instance, a right to self-preservation (as famously defended by Hobbes) seems to be plausible to me. 
And we can easily imagine, at least in extremis, direct clashes between the right to self-preservation 
and libertarian property rights (for instance, the well-known examples of a hiker who breaks into a 
cabin to save his own life, and a falling man who manages to grasp onto a flagpole and seeks entrance 
to an apartment to save himself
15
). 4) Libertarian property rights themselves can clash, as we have 
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 In response to these two specific examples, Block makes three key points against their advocates (I 
summarize considerably): 1) ―If force is used to protect property rights, even deadly force, the owner is not 
guilty of the violation of any licit law.‖ 2) ―We are invited … to empathize with the flag pole hanger, and the 
hiker, not the respective property owners.‖ 3) ―as long as these relatively rich ‗libertarians‘ have enough money 
to keep themselves from dying from poverty, the logic of their argument compels them to give every penny they 
own over and above that level to alleviate the plight of the endangered poor.‖ Block 2003. 
I respond briefly. 1) Grossly disproportionate and deadly force in defence of one‘s property can itself 
proactively impose and thereby flout liberty (e.g., ―I put landmines in my garden to deal with the trespassing of 
local children who use it as a shortcut‖). 2) Proper consideration of both sides, in the examples given, suggests 
that deadly force is itself immensely more of an aggression against the persons of the hiker and the flagpole-
hanger than their behaviours are aggressions. The fact that someone aggressed first, cannot mean that ‗anything 
goes‘ in the name of ‗defence of private property‘. 3) To assume that it is an illegitimate aggression to use 
already seen in this essay. And when they do, it is the anterior pre-propertarian principle of 
maximizing liberty (i.e., minimizing proactive impositions) that ought to be used to adjudicate the 
clash. 5) As partly explained by the foregoing points, all legitimate rights are more reasonably 
regarded as very strong prima facie rights rather than absolute rights. 6) None of this is to imply that 
compensation would not be due, even though one right had to give way to another. Of course, I could 
elaborate ad nauseam on all these points and deal with various criticisms. But I have already written 
about twice as much as Block‘s quoted passage, and we have the rest of his essay to deal with.  
“2.10. Contradiction in rights” 
 
Block rejects Friedman‘s quoted conclusion that there can be a ―right to commit a … rights violation‖ 
(16). Block argues that ―this is on a par with supposing square circles to exist. A right to violate a 
right is a veritable contradiction in terms‖. But there is no ―contradiction in terms‖ in the idea that 
some rights can trump other rights. A hierarchy of rights is perfectly conceivable. And so is the view 
that libertarian rights are very strong but prima facie. Moreover, both these views seem to be correct. 
“2.11. The draft” 
 
Block quotes Friedman describing the circumstances of a hypothetical war with insufficient volunteer 
soldiers, no matter how high the pay, whereby even a libertarian ―would rather see himself and 
everyone else temporarily enslaved by his own government than permanently enslaved by someone 
else‘s‖ (17). I should add that Friedman is supposing ―a particularly vicious totalitarian government; if 
the conquest is successful we shall all lose most of our freedom and many of us will lose our lives‖ 
(Chapter 41). He is not supposing that this case for the draft is at all realistic: ―The question is 
whether under any conceivable circumstances it could be‖ (Chapter 41). 
Block‘s reply is that ―given these unlikely circumstances, some hero would, should, come forth 
and impose a draft on the populace‖ and afterwards ―we prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law 
for mass kidnapping.‖ But it is possible that ―no one will be willing to impose any punishment upon 
our hero.‖ Finally, Block goes on to ―Suppose that all the people refuse to fight, and not a single hero 
steps forward to force them to do so. Then, that society deserves to be enslaved by the enemy‖ (17). 
It is easy to imagine a fantasy in which libertarianism would not be the best ideology. That said, it 
is not obvious that Friedman has a cast-iron example. Would it really be better to fight than to flee the 
country? Is a billion-dollar bounty not enough to have the leading political perpetrators assassinated? 
Etc. However, we could simply tighten the example to make it work. The point is that it implies 
nothing about the desirability of libertarianism as the best ideology for the real world, for which it is 
advocated. Block does not need to fear that Friedman‘s fantasy would count as a refutation of 
libertarianism and so think that libertarianism must somehow be shown to still apply. And he certainly 
does not need to add that, without volunteers or a ―hero‖, such a society ―deserves to be enslaved by 
the enemy.‖ That is a gratuitously anti-libertarian remark analogous with, though far worse than, 
blaming a burglary victim for not having a burglar alarm, or a rape victim for wearing a short skirt. 
 
“3. Utilitarian libertarianism” 
“3.1. Critique” 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
deadly force against minor self-preserving trespassing, simply does not logically imply that one is obliged to 
―alleviate the plight of the endangered poor.‖ From a libertarian viewpoint, one is not even obliged to help the 
hiker or the flagpole hanger: securing one‘s property from entry with locks, sturdy doors, etc., is fine. One is 
simply not able to shoot them or blow them up without becoming an aggressor oneself. 
Block decides that it‘s time to ―critically examine [Friedman‘s] utilitarian version of libertarianism‖ 
(18). He immediately objects that it ―leads to nose counting.‖ This appears to be a particularly weak 
version of the slippery-slope argument. It is redolent of the Puritan objection to love-making while 
standing: it could lead to dancing. In any case, this is otherwise better known as head counting, or, 
sans synecdoche, counting individual persons. This does not seem much of a criticism. Individuals are 
important, after all. However, Block asserts ―there are several key weakness[es] in this perspective.‖ 
“3.2. Weaknesses in utility theory” 
 
Block‘s first main target is that utilitarianism ―sees utility as a cardinal, not an ordinal measure‖ (18). 
He objects that ―It is impossible to meaningfully say, ‗I value this pen at 8 utils; this sandwich at 16 
utils. Therefore, I value [the] latter at twice the rate of the former.‘‖ 
The words ―impossible to meaningfully say‖ is a philosophical challenge. I think we might be 
able to make a sort of theoretical sense of cardinal utility, and make it objective too. We could 
imagine a brain scan or chemical test that showed the extent of a brain‘s pleasure centres firing or its 
serotonin levels. After a little calibration with the person‘s subjective experiences (―How do you rate 
this experience, positive or negative, from 1-10?‖) we could assign numbers to the different states that 
approximated to the degree of subjective utility and disutility. If consistent results were found over 
time, then even remote readings would match the person‘s subjective reports. Such a device would be 
a hedonometer, or a hedonimeter as the economist Edgeworth called it in his Mathematical Psychics 
(1881). It might even have practical uses as regards testing for pain or depression, possibly in a person 
appearing to be in a coma. However, suppose that such a device is not possible or, at least, 
insufficiently precise or consistent to function as cardinal. Then its impossibility would appear to be a 
contingent fact about the world – and one that might change – rather than relating to what one can 
―meaningfully say.‖ As Karl Popper rightly observed, a statement is not meaningless because it 
cannot (currently) be tested (although it is metaphysical). What is not science is not thereby nonsense 
(and it might become testable science eventually, just as theoretical physics aims to do). 
Block then goes on to object that Friedman‘s 
 
utilitarian libertarianism engages in interpersonal comparisons of utility (icu). If cardinal 
utility is nonsense, and it is, then icu is nonsense on stilts.[
16
] Here, we must say something of 
the sort that Joe rates his shoes at 50 utils, and Mary her bicycle at 150 utils, and thus Mary 
values her possession at thrice the rate as does Joe. If this isn‘t just plain silly, then nothing is. 
(18) 
 
Having constructed our hedonometer, we might go on to compare people. Of course, similar readings 
might not mean similar levels of utility. But there are ways to test for this. One such is what the 
person would do in order to achieve or avoid a certain reading on the hedonometer. But we do not 
need to pursue this line of enquiry. The point is that it is not ―nonsense‖. It is simply not, currently, 
possible (though thought-reading brain scans are developing and something like this might become 
possible eventually). However, a far more important point is being overlooked here. We can and do 
make rough-and-ready interpersonal comparisons of utility all the time. If Joe were shoeless and Mary 
bikeless, then we might well judge that a pair a shoes for Joe would give him more utility than a bike 
would do for Mary. Or we might look at two different societies and say that the people living under an 
authoritarian regime are far less happy than the people living in a relatively libertarian society (and 
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 Of course, this expression (as Block does not acknowledge) was coined by the arch-utilitarian Jeremy 
Bentham in relation to natural rights: ―Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, 
rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.‖ Anarchical Fallacies (1791-2). 
such a general ICU seems to be both true and of practical importance). Of course, we would probably 
not bother to try to put a number to either of such comparisons. But they are interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, nonetheless. Block appears to imply that precise numbers are required for any 
kind of ICUs. But clearly they are not. 
Block‘s third objection is ―the assumption that all people have equal utility … insofar as ability to 
enjoy life is concerned‖ (19). He complains that ―there is never any reason given to justify this 
assumption. It is merely blithely assumed to be correct.‖ A universal theory cannot be rightly 
criticized for lacking epistemological justification. However, a theory can be fairly criticized for being 
insufficiently explained. And that seems to be Block‘s point when he says that ―it appears to go 
against common sense.‖ Block goes on to compare ―gourmets‖ and ―wine connoisseurs‖ and the 
―cultured‖ with their opposites. And Block questions the ―facile assumption that all individuals have 
the same utility functions.‖ But, he is careful, if unwittingly comic, in quickly denying that ―we can 
ever know any such thing [one way or the other], since utility is ordinal, not cardinal, and icu are 
invalid‖ (19, Fn. 34). 
We can say several useful things in reply concerning ―utility functions.‖ 1) There is nothing in 
utilitarianism that precludes making allowances for people who are ―gourmets‖ and ―wine 
connoisseurs‖ and the ―cultured‖. So, ironically, Block is erroneous in his facile assumption that 
utilitarianism involves the ―facile assumption that all individuals have the same utility functions.‖ 2) 
However, most people are not so radically different that broad utility-comparisons cannot be made. 
For instance, ceteris paribus, people who are starving, or in pain, or ill, or grieving, or homeless, or 
poverty-stricken are suffering more than people who are not any of these things, aren‘t they? It is 
dogmatic agnosticism to pretend that ―It is impossible to meaningfully say.‖ 3) Nothing follows from 
making this admission that is in any way a threat to (deontological) libertarianism. For (deontological) 
libertarianism withstands criticism as not clashing in practice with utilitarianism (primarily in the 
form of preference-utilitarianism). Or one can express this by saying that (deontological) 
libertarianism provides the rules for rule-preference-utilitarianism. 
But Block continues that 
 
this assumption is crucial to Friedman‘s entire philosophical edifice. For without it looms the 
objection of the utility monster … who engages in mass murder, but … he values the death of 
all human beings more than we, the rest of us, collectively, value our own lives. So, …he can 
kill us all, and eat us…. (19)  
  
Every theory is more like a floating boat than a grounded ―edifice‖. But does the ―utility monster‖ 
criticism clearly sink the boat of utilitarian theory? I first ought to mention, as Block does not, that the 
―utility monster‖ was, as far as I know, originally posited as a problem for utilitarianism by Robert 
Nozick.
17
 As I am here engaged in defending my own philosophical response to Friedman, I next 
ought to outline – and elaborate on – my own replies to this type of criticism.18 This is the argument 
that giving in to people with extreme utility functions of this kind, would inevitably result in a 
competitive evolution of such monsters with each new generation ―out-wanting‖ the previous one. 
But they would not end up being any more satisfied than people originally were. In fact, they would 
almost certainly be more frustrated by their intemperance and lack of stoicism. And this is apart from 
the loss of utility of all the people who were destroyed along the way to this end state. Consequently, 
the right utilitarian thing to do is not to give in to people with intemperate emotions whenever they are 
found to exist. 
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 Nozick 1974, 41. 
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 Lester [2000] 2012, 65, 69, 77, 159, 160. 
Moreover, it seems plausible that humans have evolved to have just the sort of utility functions 
that maximize their survival and thriving – and hence maximize their utility.19 The idea that this could 
be changed without detrimental consequences is, in effect, genetic central-planning that ignores the 
spontaneous order that human utility-functions are. It is a curious irony that the main error of both 
critics and advocates of utilitarianism is that neither of them gives proper consideration to long-term 
consequences. 
However, arguendo, let us suppose that a utility monster could somehow be more sublimely 
satisfied than the whole of humanity put together (though I find it hard to make sense of that 
supposition: how satisfied could one utility monster be? And if one, why not two, etc.?). Anyway, in 
that fantasy world, then utility and liberty would diverge. But that is of no theoretical or practical 
significance as regards the congruence of liberty and utility in the actual world. 
In footnote 35, Block suggests that, ―A different type of utility monster is one for whom the 
benefits of rape, to him, outweigh the costs‖ to the victim (20). Again, the long-term consequence of 
allowing extreme utility functions to be trumps cannot be to maximize utility. This encourages, in 
defence or retaliation, the habitual – and eventually evolutionary – fostering of counterbalancing 
disutility in (potential) rape victims. It would be, in effect, an arms race of emotional intemperance. 
Utility could not plausibly be the winner. 
Block is not entirely right that ―this is an extreme example.‖ For very intemperate people, at least, 
already exist. So the option is already there to give in to them and thereby encourage such habits, and 
ultimately such evolved types of people. But courts should normally reject any defence that is based 
on the alleged presence of an extreme utility function in the accused person. Block thinks that it is 
―unlikely, no, impossible, that anyone can ever prove he is a utility monster.‖ On the contrary, we 
might ―prove‖ (in the sense of test) the thesis in a variety of ways. One would be our hedonometer. 
Another would be seeing the extreme sorts of things that a person is prepared to do, including giving 
or receiving payment, to achieve or avoid some outcome. Consider the extreme behaviour of some 
users of hard drugs, for instance. Clearly they have temporarily made themselves into one kind of, 
relatively mild, ―utility monster‖. However, that is no good utilitarian reason to make them any less 
liable for any crimes they commit. It is, however, a good utilitarian reason to fully legalize their drugs. 
For that would promote both more utility and more liberty. 
Now Block turns to an example that he thinks is ―rather more realistic.‖ 
 
“3.3. Innocent prisoner” 
 
He gives a version of the well-known example of a sheriff, a prisoner, and a lynch mob. The sheriff 
 
has in lock-up a black man falsely accused of raping a white woman. The white mob outside 
the jail demands the prisoner in order to torture and then hang him. If the sheriff accedes to 
this demand, one innocent black man dies. If the jailer refuses, the mob will attack. The sheriff 
will kill half the mob, be murdered himself, and the black prisoner will still be lynched. What 
oh what should the sheriff do? (20) 
 
Block replies, ―The principled libertarian answer is very straightforward … Start shooting at the lynch 
mob, go down fighting, and the devil take the hindmost.‖ Well, say I, at least wait until they attack 
first: perhaps they might not. And why is the sheriff obliged, for libertarian reasons, to kill members 
of the mob and die himself when he knows the situation is hopeless? 
                                                   
19
 For instance, pain will give immediate disutility. But those born unable to feel pain suffer physical damage 
and shortened lives. 
Block continues: ―The Friedmanite utilitarian ‗libertarian‘ will have to take the opposite tack, at 
least at first glance. ... the sheriff turns the innocent prisoner over to the mob‖ (20). However, Block 
concedes that Friedman 
 
does have a way to avoid this pitfall. … If and when word of this gets out, horrid precedents 
will be set for the future. Lynch mobs will become emboldened. Prisoners will not trust 
lawmen to protect them. They will thus be less likely to surrender, and more likely to try to 
shoot their way out of being arrested, which means more deaths. Law and order will be 
brought into disrepute, and many more people will die than half of this particular one 
(relatively small) lynch mob, one innocent prisoner, and one sheriff doing his proper job. (21) 
 
Exactly. This is not merely ―a way to avoid this pitfall‖ but an entirely reasonable account of why this 
is the correct (rule-)utilitarian position. But Block is not satisfied, for 
 
there are so many, many ways in which secrecy can be maintained. The world could end right 
after that monumental injustice took place. A magician could come along and interfere with 
the memory of the half of the mob that survived, plus any bystanders. This episode could, 
more realistically have taken place in an isolated area, with no children, where no one else 
would ever hear of this sheriff‘s malfeasance, and all the surviving elderly members of the 
mob soon die. Or, we could suppose any of this to be true arguendo. (21) 
 
Yes of course, arguendo, a clash between liberty and utility is possible in a fantasy. And it will even 
occur from time to time in reality. So what? The systematic practical congruence of liberty and utility 
is what matters. And this is good news: we humans can have the best of both worlds. And libertarians 
and utilitarians ought to be allies. However, one is a libertarian first and foremost if one holds that, in 
reality, it is vastly better to have a very strong presumption in favour of liberty that can only be 
overridden by other values in extremis. 
“3.4. The eyes have it” 
 
Next Block tackles one of the classic ―body parts‖ criticisms of utilitarianism. He suggests that it 
would be utilitarian if David Friedman were ―forced‖ to give up one of his eyes to someone who is 
blind. And as he has not done so voluntarily, ―he fails to be a consistent utilitarian ‗libertarian‘‖ (22). 
Several responses. 1) To advocate an ideology for a society is not to commit oneself to trying to 
live by it personally – whether or not the ideology is adopted by a society. 2) If one were to try to live 
by it personally without social adoption, then one might well suffer the costs without enjoying the 
benefits. Why should that be an obligation only on a sincere advocate (a victim of the system) and no 
one else (the perpetrators of the system)? 3) There are obvious moral hazards in making transplants of 
eyes, etc., compulsory. People will not look after themselves with as much care. 4) Any serious 
attempt to make such things compulsory would quite possibly result in an armed struggle between the 
government and the people until the policy is abandoned after much disutility has been inflicted. 5) 
Most important of all, a far more utilitarian and libertarian practical solution in reality is allowing free 
markets in all body parts, including eyes.
20
 Fantasy clashes between liberty and utility are of no 
theoretical or practical significance. 
“3.5. Anti market regulations” 
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Block notes Friedman‘s ―free market anarchist‖ credentials. But he objects that ―Friedman bases his 
viewpoint on these matters on utilitarian, not deontological or principled libertarian grounds‖ (22). 
Consequently, ―if the few winners from these dirigisme institutions count more heavily than the many 
losers, then …This author would then be precluded from defending even these elementary and basic 
aspects of the free enterprise philosophy.‖ And so Block asks ―In what sense, then, can Friedman‘s 
views even be considered libertarian?‖ 
And the correct reply must be that someone is a libertarian if he advocates universal interpersonal 
liberty. What more, or less, could be needed? And this Friedman does do (albeit with an implicit and 
approximate theory of liberty, as most libertarians have – including Block himself). Hence Friedman 
is a libertarian. One‘s motives for advocating universal liberty are a separate matter. 
According to Block, though, Friedman is only a libertarian ―if we posit equal utilities for all 
people, and icu. We can demonstrate, based on these assumptions, that these interferences with the 
market hurt more people, and more seriously, than they help‖ (23). As we have seen, we don‘t need to 
―posit equal utilities for all people‖ to defend free-market conjectures. Moreover, Block is equating 
markets with liberty without any explanation as to their alleged identity. Nevertheless, both Friedman 
and Block do advocate liberty in their own implicit and confused ways. Of course, ―Friedman simply 
has no warrant for these assumptions‖. Neither does Block for his. Assumptions don‘t need warrants. 
And warrants would be epistemologically worthless, in any case. So it is true that Friedman‘s 
―intellectual edifice … is based on nothing at all.‖ So is Block‘s. And so is everyone‘s. That is one 
consequence of critical rationalism‘s being the true epistemology. But as long as we are prepared to 
take criticism seriously, then there is the chance of discovering errors in our conjectures. And that is 
another consequence of critical rationalism‘s being the true epistemology. 
 
“4. Conclusion” 
 
Block finishes by upbraiding Friedman for not giving proper references and quotations. Instead, he 
―criticized what some libertarian or other said about something that Friedman overheard‖ (23). And 
Block somewhat harshly asserts that ―Friedman‘s practice is a disgrace to good scholarship.‖ 
However, he also then congratulates Friedman for ―giving deontological libertarianism a good run for 
its money. There is no principled libertarian who can hold this position without being able to deal 
with Friedman‘s excellent, although mistaken, objections.‖ 
Yes, there is a difference between being a scholar and being a thinker – although they partly 
complement each other. And Friedman would have done slightly better to have more real quotations 
where possible. Block himself occasionally draws on philosophical literature without quotations or 
references. But I do not thereby impugn his scholarship. And I thank him for his stimulating, although 
mistaken, arguments. As we have seen, a proper theory of liberty combined with a critical-rationalist 
approach and various alternative assumptions can solve Friedman‘s philosophical problems in a far 
more convincing manner than the approximations and ad hoc additions of Rothbardism. 
 
Appendix: Replies to Two Commentators 
 
There were a couple of review responses to a submitted draft of this essay. After carefully considering 
them both, there appears to be no reason to significantly alter anything as a result. Nevertheless, it 
remains more than likely that the reactions of these two commentators will be similar to many 
potential readers. Consequently, it might be helpful to have brief replies to the comments here. They 
will be quoted in full and interpreted literally. 
 
 
 
First commentator 
 
the paper reads like an arbitrary selection of unrelated topics. After reading the paper, I have 
no idea what it is trying to do and what its intended contribution is. 
 
How these topics are related and the purpose of the essay is explained in the title. It is explained again 
in the abstract. It is explained yet again in the opening paragraph. And it is explained once more in the 
conclusion. There are also a few explanatory remarks throughout the essay. 
 
Let me put it another way: I don‘t think this paper passes the ―so what?‖ test. Let us say that 
Block‘s arguments are faulty. Why does it matter? 
 
Why does it matter in a libertarian scholarly periodical that a leading libertarian‘s arguments are 
faulty? What could matter more in that context? 
 
What is the significance of Block‘s errors? 
 
If they are errors, then they cannot be used to explain and defend libertarianism against Friedman‘s 
philosophical problems and objections, as Block (a leading Rothbardian) intends. 
 
Do they mean that utilitarian libertarianism can be rehabilitated? That deontological 
libertarianism is flawed? That critical rationalist libertarianism is a good alternative? 
 
At various points in response to Block, the essay argues that utilitarianism does not systematically 
clash with liberty in practice. At various points in response to Block, it also argues that deontological 
libertarianism is best viewed as prima facie rather than as absolute. Consequently, it is argued, there is 
no need to take sides between consequentialism and deontologism in practice (rather than in far-
fetched or unusual cases). However, it is argued, critical rationalism entails that it is impossible to 
base libertarianism on either of these, or anything else, and so it needs to be advocated as an unrefuted 
conjecture. All this is quite clear on any careful reading. 
 
Papers such as this need to take special care to not simply criticize, but to create.  
 
This is an erroneous remark on two levels. First, there is nothing wrong with simply criticizing 
alleged errors by trying to show that they are errors: there is no moral or intellectual obligation to 
come up with a better alternative. Second, in each and every case an alternative theory is, in fact, 
offered – just as the essay says it will do. 
 
Perhaps that is what the author intended to do with the references to critical rationalism, but 
this is unclear. 
 
Critical rationalism is clearly explained and clearly applied where relevant. But it is offered as an 
alternative only to relevant parts of Block‘s replies to Friedman. 
 
The reader is still left wondering what this paper is trying to add to our understanding. 
 
As repeatedly explained throughout, in each case the essay seeks to show what is wrong with the 
Blockian/Rothbardian orthodoxy in response to David Friedman‘s problems and then seeks to offer a 
better, albeit heterodox, solution. 
 Second commentator 
 
This paper strikes me as rather random. 
 
For ease of reference, as is explained, this essay replies to Block‘s points in the order in which he 
makes them. That is not random. 
 
Block‘s papers tend to address many different topics, and his critique of Friedman is no 
different, coming across as rather disconnected. The problem is that because of this, the 
present paper critiquing Block is even more disjointed. 
 
Block usefully and interestingly deals with a series of relatively ―disconnected‖ issues in Friedman‘s 
famous and influential book. It is not a problem that they are ―disconnected‖ and so it is not a problem 
that replies to them are similarly ―disconnected‖. The reviewer does not explain how there is 
supposed to be a problem with having ―disconnected‖ points. Is the idea that, in some way, an essay 
should always have a single unifying principle that applies to every point? If so, that is an error. 
 
The section based on Block‘s introduction seems irrelevant. The arguments made in this 
section have nothing to do with Block‘s paper on Friedman. 
 
The ―section based on Block‘s introduction‖ is relevant because it contains important replies to 
crucial points that are initially made there by Block in his paper on Friedman. In any case, it is 
denying the manifest facts to say that they ―have nothing to do with Block‘s paper on Friedman.‖ 
 
They are views Block expresses in many places, and which are conventionally held by other 
libertarians as well. 
 
It is irrelevant that Block expresses these views ―in many places.‖ It is even more clearly irrelevant 
that they are ―conventionally held by other libertarians as well.‖ They are in his paper and it is 
legitimate to contest them. 
 
As I read through the rest of the paper, I realized that this problem appears several times; 
many of Block‘s arguments are briefly and weakly presented in his paper on Friedman, 
whereas they are developed further and more coherently in other places (e.g. in Rothbard‘s 
works and Block‘s own writing). 
 
There is nothing wrong with Block‘s replying to Friedman by outlining his views and giving 
references to more detailed discussions. And there is nothing wrong with someone replying to Block 
in a similar fashion. 
 
I conclude that the specific project of this paper (a reply to Block‘s paper on Friedman) is 
misguided. 
 
I conclude that the view that a published scholarly essay can have been written in such a way that any 
attempt to reply to it ―is misguided‖ is misguided. 
 
If the author wishes to establish critical rationalism as a viable alternative to others views, 
 
The reply to Block is about a host of issues, as is Block‘s original article, and certainly not only about 
critical rationalism. It is, in any case, incompatible with critical rationalism to attempt to ―establish‖ it. 
 
or wishes to criticize others for unduly neglecting it, 
 
The purpose is to point out that it exists and what it is. This will be interesting news for some people.  
 
then the paper should be written as a stand-alone piece, not as a reply. 
 
But the paper is clearly not about critical rationalism in particular. That is merely one issue. 
 
By the way, Block‘s comment on the two types of libertarianism is a throw-away line, and 
should not be taken as a sustained argument. 
 
Block means what he says, and contesting it is germane to the whole essay. The absence of sustained 
argument cannot make it irrelevant to mention a third option. 
 
Further, when discussing critical-rationalist libertarianism, the author seems rather upset that 
Block has overlooked it. 
 
On the contrary, as is explicitly and sincerely stated, ―I am very happy to bring Professor Block the 
good news that there is at least one other philosophy of libertarianism.‖ It seems the reviewer is 
―rather upset‖ by any mentioning of it, for reasons best known to himself. 
 
Yet at the same time, the author does not supply the reader with much information about this 
strand of libertarianism. 
 
Critical rationalism and how it applies to libertarianism is explained at what appears to be a suitable 
length in the context. Any interested readers are referred to additional reading (just as Block does 
himself). 
 
The author can hardly object to Block overlooking critical rationalist libertarianism if that 
approach has few exponents or published works to advance it. 
 
It is intellectually irrelevant whether a position has any exponents at all or any published works 
whatsoever. It is always relevant to point out a criticism. That is, of course, not to imply that Block is 
blameworthy for not having noticed it. 
 
To put it bluntly, the argument comes off as conceited. 
 
Such ad hominems are irrelevant to any argument, of course. But to explain an approach to 
libertarianism that Block has overlooked, and which is crucial to many of the succeeding arguments 
that answer him, is entirely relevant.  
 
The author seems to simply be complaining that Block has neglected the author‘s own views, 
and that this is a very grave problem. 
 
It is argued that Block‘s responses to Friedman‘s problems fail for all the reasons that are given, and 
then there is an argument for a better alternative in each case. Of course, the arguments that any 
author puts forward must, in one sense, be his views. That is inevitable. Perhaps it would, in principle, 
be possible to excise any references to oneself. But just as Block refers – quite normally and 
relevantly – to his own views and works in replying to Friedman, so the essay refers to the author‘s 
own in replying to Block. 
 
I would hesitate in this comment if it were not for the fact that the author makes references to 
himself or herself throughout the text, awkwardly mentioned his or her own opinion, as if this 
were of intrinsic interest to the reader. 
 
Just as Block does in his paper, of course, and just as this reviewer himself does – although both are 
also entirely proper and pertinent. In particular, however, the reviewer appears to have completely 
overlooked what the essay is explicitly about: it is a critical commentary and a comparison between 
Block‘s Rothbardian responses to Friedman‘s philosophical problems and the author‘s very different 
theoretical responses. Therefore, the author can hardly fail to mention his own opinions. 
 
How can the author declare (at the end of the paper) that critical rationalism is the true 
epistemology? 
 
That one may assume anything is a rule of logic. However, the truth of critical rationalism was 
explained at the beginning of the essay. Why does the commentator simply ignore that explanation 
instead of attempting to fault it? 
 
This is certainly not proven in the paper. 
 
Of course it isn‘t ―proven‖. That would be inconsistent with critical rationalism, as is clearly 
explained at the start of the essay. 
 
Also, wouldn‘t claiming its truth in some way establish it as more than a mere conjecture? 
 
Of course not. As is explained in the essay, to assert something as true does not entail that it has been 
supported in any way. But if the reviewer wishes to disagree with critical rationalism, then why does 
he not attempt to fault the specific explanation given in the essay? 
 
Even if this is not the case, the author ends by saying that there is no basis for libertarianism. 
But this is very different from saying that any basis for libertarianism is a conjectural one. 
 
No it isn‘t. A conjecture is not an epistemological basis. And, as critical rationalism explains, such a 
basis is neither possible nor necessary. 
 
Perhaps I am misreading the author‘s words, but the way the author phrases the conclusion 
make it sound more like epistemological nihilism. 
 
Again, the commentator completely ignores the initial explanation of critical rationalism. To mistake 
critical rationalism for ―epistemological nihilism‖ is philosophically ignorant. The conclusion does 
include the remark, ―But as long as we are prepared to take criticism seriously, then there is the 
chance of discovering errors in our conjectures.‖ Such modest but hopeful fallibilism is clearly not 
―epistemological nihilism.‖ 
 
Lastly, if none of these approaches is truly a basis for libertarianism, 
 
Because, as is explained in the essay, there cannot be a ―basis for libertarianism‖ or any other type of 
theory. 
 
then why on earth should we care about Block or Friedman‘s arguments? 
 
Because, as is explained in the essay, the way to seek truth is to expose theories to criticism in the 
hope of eliminating error. 
 
Why does Block‘s view on innocent prisoners matter if his whole approach to libertarianism is 
wrong? 
 
It is not completely wrong, as is stated in the essay. And it is illuminating to see exactly to what extent 
and how Block‘s responses to Friedman are wrong. This is, after all, the repeatedly stated purpose of 
the essay. 
 
Why does the author feel the need to critique minor points if the systems for which they are 
relevant must be rejected? 
 
There is no ―critique‖ in the philosophical sense of an immanent criticism; there are only specific 
criticisms. None of the issues discussed are ―minor points.‖ There are no real ―systems‖ here. And, in 
any case, a valid way to refute a general theory is to refute the consequences it implies (modus 
tollendo tollens). 
 
Conclusion to Appendix 
 
As has been shown, none of either commentator‘s criticisms has any force. Of course, this might have 
been different if the chosen commentators had some greater competence in philosophy or had, at least, 
read more carefully. 
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